The Application of RICO to International Terrorism by Joseph, Zvi
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 5 Article 8 
1990 
The Application of RICO to International Terrorism 
Zvi Joseph 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zvi Joseph, The Application of RICO to International Terrorism, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1071 (1990). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE APPLICATION OF RICO TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism' has existed for centuries.2 A terrorist incident traditionally
results in a public outcry for government action to eliminate this
scourge.3 There are presently several criminal statutes that can be ap-
plied, directly or indirectly, to terrorist organizations,4 as well as a
1. Terrorism has been defined as " 'premeditated, politically motivated violence per-
petrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents,
usually intended to influence an audience." Nathan & Juster, Law Enforcement Against
International Terrorists: Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 553, 553 n.4(1989) (quoting Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, at inside front
cover (1988)); see also Report of the New York State Policy Study Group on Terrorism 3
(1985) [hereinafter New York State Policy Study] (terrorism is "'a tactic or technique by
means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creat-
ing overwhelming fear for coercive purposes"' (quoting Report of the Task Force on
Disorders and Terrorism 3 (1976))).
International terrorism has been defined as violent acts that "occur totally outside the
United States, or transcend national boundaries" and are intended "(A) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a government[; or] (C) to affect
the conduct of a government." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982).
2. Although terrorism has existed for centuries, the term terrorist was first coined in
the Jacobin era (1793-94). See A. Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law 1 (1989).
3. For example, in 1985 Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise ship, the
Achille Lauro. In the ensuing drama, the terrorists killed an american citizen, Leon
Klinghoffer, and dumped his body overboard. Following the Achille Lauro affair, there
was a surge of rage against terrorist organizations. See Freedman, Across the Country, A
Sense of Euphoria and Cries for Blood, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 4; Jubi-
lant Justice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, § 1, at 26, col. 1; A Moment to Savor, L.A. Times,
Oct. 13, 1985, Part 4, at 4, col. 1. In response to the public outcry, President Reagan
dispatched jet fighters to intercept the airplane carrying the terrorists. For a more de-
tailed account and analysis of the Achille Lauro incident, see generally, A. Cassese, supra
note 2.
In general, the United State's response to terrorist incidents has varied. At times it has
responded decisively in an effort to deter future terrorist activities. See, eg., Cannon &
Wilson, Reagan Ready to Act ifLibya Is Linked to Berlin Bombing, Wash. Post, Apr. 10,
1986, § 1, at Al (considering possible responses to Libya's alleged assistance of terrorist
organization that bombed West German discotheque); Wilson & Hoffman, U.S War-
planes Bomb Targets in Libya as 'Self-Defense' Against Terrorism, Wash. Post, Apr. 15,
1986, at Al (precision bombing of Libya, which allegedly assisted terrorist organization
responsible for bombing West German discotheque); Nelson, U.S. Jets Intercept Plane
with Ship Hiackers, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, Part 1, at 1, col. 6 (F14 jet-fighters to
intercept airplane carrying terrorists who hijacked ship and killed American citizen).
Occasionally, the response has been more passive in nature: imposing economic sanc-
tions. See 31 C.F.R. § 550 (1989); see also Exec. Order No. 12,538 (Nov. 15, 1985) (or-
dering embargo on Libyan oil); Proclamation No. 5141 (Dec. 22, 1983) (restriction on
Libyan oil); Proclamation No. 4907 (Mar. 10, 1982) (same).
4. See, ag., Omnibus Diplomatic Security & Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-399, 100 Stat. 853, 896-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988)) (penalties for terrorist
acts of murder and assault against U.S. nationals abroad); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988) (con-
ferring jurisdiction over, and imposing penalties upon, those who take hostages to influ-
ence U.S. government or citizens).
There is also a group of criminal statutes designed to protect specific groups of people
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number of international agreements that target terrorism.5 In spite of the
action taken against international terrorism, however, the number of in-
ternational terrorist incidents against American targets has increased.6
One avenue that has not been greatly explored is the use of the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")7 as a weapon
against terrorism. Through RICO, the United States can strike at the
organizations that support international terrorism.' Although applying
RICO would add to the criminal sanctions available to attack terrorism,9
there are fundamental jurisdictional and policy questions which must be
addressed before RICO can be applied to international terrorist organiza-
tions. These issues include the general applicability of RICO to non-
financially motivated enterprises,' 0 the use of crimes committed abroad
as RICO predicate acts,' 1 and the ability of the United States to obtain
that can be used indirectly to punish terrorist activity directed against these individuals.
See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (penalties for assault on foreign official); id. at § 115
(penalties for assault on family members of certain government officials); id. at § 351
(penalties for assassination, kidnapping, or assault of member of Congress, Cabinet or
Supreme Court Justice); id at § 1114 (penalties for murdering officer or employee of
United States); id at § 1116 (penalties for murdering foreign official); id. at § 1201(aX4)
(penalties for kidnapping foreign official); id at § 1201(a)(5) (penalties for kidnapping
federal officers); id. at § 1751 (penalties for assassination, kidnapping, or assault of Presi-
dent, Vice President, or their staff members).
5. See, eg., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (de-
tailing unlawful acts, levels of mutual assistance, jurisdiction, extradition, and other re-
sponsibilities); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (same); Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 21 (treatment of hijackers and powers of aircraft commanders); Con-
vention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (defining piracy and setting out rules for interception).
6. See Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, reprinted in The
1987 Annual on Terrorism 391 (Y. Alexander & A. Foxman eds. 1989) [hereinafter
Global Terrorism]; see also Broder, Terrorism Still Rising, U.S. Expert Says, L.A. Times,
Sept. 28, 1988, Part 1, at 5, col. 4 (terrorist incidents set record in 1988); Expert Says '88
May Be Record Yearfor Terrorism, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1988, § 1, at A22 (terrorist
incidents set record in 1988 and terrorism against U.S. targets consistently 20 to 25 per-
cent of all incidents).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
8. See infra notes 13-54 and accompanying text.
One commentator noted that the use of RICO against terrorism "presents [RICO's]
most innovative face, and its most significant challenge to orthodox notions of criminal
law." Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III and IV, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 920, 932 (1987).
9. RICO would allow the prosecution of organizations operating through criminal
terrorist activity and would subject those organizations to various criminal penalties in-
cluding asset forfeiture, a remedy not available in traditional anti-terrorism statutes. This
would enable the United States to curtail the funds available to international terrorist
organizations. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
11. The term "predicate act" is the informal name used to refer to those crimes which
are statutorily defined as racketeering activity. See, e g., United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d
632, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1984) (extortion, collection of unlawful debt and violation of
1990] RICO & TERRORISM 1073
the forfeiture of assets abroad.1 2
Part I of this Note discusses RICO and its applicability to non-finan-
cially motivated enterprises. Part H of this Note addresses the problems
of applying RICO to international terrorism and advocates the use of
extraterritorial predicate acts in RICO prosecutions. Part II further sug-
gests that the federal government may use state law crimes committed
abroad as predicate acts in RICO prosecutions. This section also dis-
cusses the utility of recently ratified Mutual Legal Assistance treaties in
effecting forfeiture of these organizations' assets abroad. This Note con-
cludes that RICO's unique characteristics suggest that it should be used
as a weapon against international terrorist organizations.
I. RICO's APPLICABILITY TO NON-FINANCIALLY MOTIVATED
ENTERPRISES
RICO was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.1 A RICO prosecution must show that the defendants engaged in
Travel Act called predicate acts); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir.)
(conspiracies to murder called predicate acts), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
12. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). The Act states that
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity... to use or invest,
... any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
The Act contains criminal penalties, such as twenty years or life imprisonment and
forfeiture of any property acquired in violation of section 1962, see id. at § 1963, and civil
remedies, such as awarding treble damages, costs, and attorney fees to persons injured in
business or property. See id at § 1964.
This Note will not address the use of RICO's civil remedies against international ter-
rorism. It will, however, use precedents and principles developed in civil RICO litigation
to aid in analyzing RICO's applicability to international terrorism. Courts generally
agree that precedents developed in civil RICO litigation can be applied to criminal
RICO. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 800 (1990) (new interpretations of civil
RICO may disrupt criminal RICO uniformity) (White J., concurring); McLendon v.
Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1511 (D.N.L 1985) (citing both civil and
criminal RICO cases as supporting precedent); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476,
491 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (criminal and civil RICO decisions should be given similar
precedential import).
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a "pattern of racketeering activity"'14 and derived income from those ac-
tivities that was used to operate, maintain, or acquire an interest in an
"enterprise' 5 that affects interstate or foreign commerce."6 RICO also
makes it unlawful to conduct or participate in an enterprise that affects
interstate or foreign commerce "through" a pattern of racketeering
activity.' 7
With rare exceptions,'" international terrorism is perpetrated by indi-
viduals and organizations with some social or political motivation. To
such organizations, "[t]he ultimate goal of the crime [is] not riches, it [is]
revolution."' 9 Some courts have concluded that a RICO violation re-
quires economic motivation;2' therefore, this "ultimate goal" may limit
14. "'[R]acketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ing, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,... chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). In
addition to these state law crimes, there are a variety of federal crimes that are also RICO
predicates. See, eg., id. at § 1951 (Hobbs Act, prohibiting extortionate or violent inter-
ference with commerce); id at § 1952 (Travel Act, prohibiting travel to commit crimes);
see also United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1984) (extortion, collection
of unlawful debt and violation of Travel Act as RICO predicates).
The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" was recently discussed by the
Supreme Court in HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). The
Court held that a pattern of racketeering requires at least two criminal acts demonstrat-
ing some level of continuity and threat of future criminal action. See id. at 2898-902; see
also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) ("[it is] continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern" (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 158
(1969) (emphasis added by court)).
15. "'[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
The "enterprise" required by RICO is not limited to legitimate enterprises. Any enter-
prise, even those which are criminal in nature, can fulfill the "enterprise" requirement of
section 1962. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981); United States v.
Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 137 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985).
Existence of a continuing core of personnel motivated by a common interest is suffi-
cient to constitute an association-in-fact RICO enterprise. See United States v. Perholtz,
842 F.2d 343, 352-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). See generally Tarlow, Rico: The New Darling of the
Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 165, 180-83 (1980) (discussion of elements of
RICO).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(o) (1988).
Sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) prohibit subsequently investing proceeds of racketeering
activities in an external enterprise. To violate section 1962(c), however, the defendants'
acts of racketeering are committed as part of their involvement in an enterprise. See
United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir.) ("through" means that defendant is
enabled to commit predicate offenses by virtue of involvement in an enterprise), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331-33 (5th Cir.
1983) ("through" means position in enterprise facilitated commission of predicate acts),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
18. See, eg., Car Bomb Kills 16 in Columbia, Chi. Trib., Apr. 12, 1990, at 3 (renewal
of bombing spree to protect drug related economic interest); Columbia Says Bomb Led to
Crash Last Month ofPlane Carrying 107, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at A12, col. 3 (same).
19. New York State Policy Study, supra note 1, at 5.
20. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
841 (1985); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840
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the applicability of RICO to most international terrorist organizations.21
An initial issue which must be resolved, then, is whether RICO can be
applied to non-financially motivated organizations.
A. RICO and Economic Motivation
In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited the use of
RICO against non-financially motivated organizations and thus re-
stricted its potential application to non-financially motivated interna-
tional terrorism.
In a trio of cases, 22 the Second Circuit held that a RICO enterprise
requires a financial purpose23 and that RICO cannot be applied to a
group lacking a demonstrable financial motivation.24 The Second Circuit
did not require that the financial motivation be the primary motivating
factor of the enterprise; rather, "[tihere must merely be 'some financial
purpose,' ... either to the criminal enterprise or the [predicate acts]."' 5
The basis for the Second Circuit's interpretation was the perception that
RICO was created to remedy a specific "mischief," and an enterprise,
"when unaccompanied by any financial motive.., is beyond [RICO's]
(1983); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 61 (2d. Cir. 1983); United States v. Anderson,
626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
21. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61. But see Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,
868 F.2d 1342, 1349 n.7 (3d Cir.) (evidence of financial motive unnecessary), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (no dismissal of RICO
action for lack of financial purpose).
22. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S.
841 (1985); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840(1983); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Ivic, the Second Circuit held that RICO did not apply to a group of terrorists that
had no demonstrable financial motive. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 65. A few months later in
Bagarie, the court refused to apply the Ivic court's language literally and instead only
required that "some" financial purpose be shown. See Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 55. In Fergu-
son, the most recent Second Circuit case to address the issue, the court held that "[tihere
must merely be 'some financial purpose" either to the criminal enterprise or the [predicate]
acts .... [Ivic] does not stand for the proposition that there must be a significant eco-
nomic purpose for RICO to apply." See Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 853 (quoting United
States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original).
23. The evic Court stated that the term 'enterprise' as used in a RICO context refers
to a profit making organization. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60. In Bagaric, the court held that
the prosecution could "show 'financial purpose' through either the enterprise or the pred-
icate acts of racketeering." Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 56. But see MeMonagle, 868 F.2d at
1349 n.7 (evidence of financial motive unnecessary), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989);
Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D (no dismissal of RICO action for lack of financial purpose).
24. See Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63. In Bagaric, however, the defendants had participated in
an extortion and terror campaigu. See Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 46-51. The court, therefore,
had no difficulty finding a financial purpose behind the predicate crimes. See id. at 57-58.
Likewise in Ferguson, the court held that members of a politically motivated enterprise,
the Black Liberation Army, who financed their movement through a series of robberies
and murders, had sufficient economic purpose to uphold a RICO conviction. See Fergu-
son, 758 F.2d at 853.
25. Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 853 (quoting United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d
Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original)).
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contemplated reach."26 Other courts have also implied that there must
be a financial purpose to an enterprise in order to permit application of
RICO.
By refusing to recognize RICO's applicability to non-financially moti-
vated enterprises, the Second Circuit has arguably added a new element
of motive.28 As a general rule, unless motive is an element of the crime,
evidence of religious, moral, or political beliefs do not exculpate a de-
fendant from liability for criminal actions.29 RICO was drafted using
general terms, and although its legislative history is laden with rhetoric
concerning organized crime, nowhere does the statute specifically ad-
dress the issue of motivation.3 0
Even when motive is not explicitly listed as an element of a crime, a
statute may be interpreted to require a particular motive.31 This does not
mean, however, that in all cases in which a statute prohibits an act using
general terms a court should require a particular motive.32 Had Con-
26. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1983).
27. See United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cer4 denied, 109 S. Ct.
511 (1988); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert, denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981). But see Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. MeMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342, 1349 n.7 (3d Cir.) (unnecessary to decide whether evidence showed an economic
motive "[b]ecause... economic motivation is unnecessary."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261
(1989); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (improper to dismiss RICO action
solely for lack of financial motivation).
Although the Second and Third Circuits appear to disagree about whether a RICO
enterprise requires financial motivation, the two circuits may not actually be in conflict.
The Second Circuit has not addressed the issues presented in Ivic in a number of years,
during which time the Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of RICO. See, e.g.,
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2897-906 (1989) (explaining
RICO pattern requirement); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491, 493-96
(1985) (civil RICO action does not require prior racketeering conviction and RICO re-
quires no organized crime nexus). In fact, the Second Circuit itself had begun limiting
the scope of the Ivic decision prior to the Supreme Court decisions. It may be that the
Third Circuit's position is merely the final step in the Second Circuit's decisions limiting
Ivic. Ivic, however, is still good law in the Second Circuit. It will therefore require af-
firmative action by the Second Circuit to resolve this issue.
28. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 113-16 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); see
also Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 29 (1912) (good motive
not factor); Note, Motive as an Essential Element of Crime, 35 Dick. L. Rev. 105, 109-10
(1931) (motive generally not factor unless explicit in statute).
One of the rationales behind this rule is that
[i]f a religious, moral, or political purpose may exculpate illegal behavior, one
might commit bigamy to avoid eternal damnation; steal from the rich to give
alms to the poor;, bum and destroy ... to implement a Utopian design.
One who elects to serve mankind by taking the law into his own hands
thereby demonstrates his conviction that his own ability to determine policy is
superior to democratic decision making.
Cullen, 454 F.2d at 392.
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
31. See Note, supra note 29, at 114-15.
32. See id. In deciding whether to interpret RICO to require an economic motive,
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gress intended to limit RICO to financially motivated associations, it
could have done so by inserting the words "economically motivated"
into the statute.33
Congress did not choose to limit the scope of RICO in such a restric-
tive manner. Although congressional intent in enacting the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 was to "seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime,"34 that was not its sole
purpose." Congress was creating a generic statute capable of encapsu-
lating any criminal behavior that mimicked "organized crime." 36 Sena-
tor McClellan, who introduced the Organized Crime Control Act,
emphasized that RICO did not merely attack organized crime. He ob-
served that "[lt is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches
most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not in-
clude offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime
as well."37 To effectuate this purpose, Congress enacted RICO as a gen-
eral intent statute without an explicit mens rea or motive3" and insisted
that the entire Act "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."3 9
courts must not consider a statutorily "unmanifested legislative state of mind.... The
purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which Congress should have enacted, or
would have. It is that which it did enact, however ineptly." Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1947).
33. Cf United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) ("Had Congress not in-
tended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the
definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.' ").
34. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (Statement of Findings and Pur-
pose); see also 135 Cong. Rec. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statements of Senator
DeConcini) (commenting that purpose of RICO was to eradicate organized crime).
35. RICO was enacted to combat "highly sophisticated diversified and widespread
activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful
conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption .... " Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
"Organized crime" was merely the catch-all description for various forms of group
criminality. See 116 Cong. Rec. 18913 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan); see also
G. Blakey, Materials on RICO: Criminal Overview, in 1 Techniques in the Investigation
and Prosecution of Organized Crime 4 (1980) (RICO applies to violent offenses
generally).
36. See 116 Cong. Rec. 18,940 (1970).
37. Id.
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); Kolen, RICO and State of Mind, in 3 Tech-
niques in the Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime 1304 (1980).
39. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947;
see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (limiting RICO im-
proper because of its expansive language and liberal construction clause); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (judiciary's unwillingness to construe strictly RICO
direct result of liberal construction clause).
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Courts have recognized that RICO is to be applied broadly."° In the
years since its enactment, RICO has been used in a variety of situations,
many of which appear to differ from Congress' stated purpose of combat-
ting organized crime.41 RICO has been used in cases involving an unfair
discharge,42 employment discrimination, sexual discrimination and har-
assment,43 employment contracts,' anti-abortion protests,45 matrimonial
disputes,46 and the administration of personal estates.47 Accordingly, the
activities of terrorist organizations, traditionally not considered "organ-
ized crime," nonetheless appear to fit within the orbit of the behavior
RICO was designed to combat.
A second argument supporting the application of RICO to organiza-
tions lacking financial motivation is based upon recent congressional ac-
tion. Congress has proposed to expand RICO's power in the realm of
international terrorism4 8 by adding terrorist acts abroad 9 and hostage-
taking5° to the list of RICO predicates. The Second Circuit has posited
that Congress' original intent in enacting RICO was to require economic
motivation.51 Nowhere in the RICO Reform Act of 1989 have its draft-
40. See, eg., H.. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2904 (1989)
("Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious language capable of
extending beyond organized crime."); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350,
1355 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The scope of the civil RICO statute is breathtaking... but it is not
for this court to question policies decided by Congress.").
41. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
Criminal RICO has also been tacked onto ordinary state law crimes with no nexus to
organized crime. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 301-06 (7th Cir. 1979)(robbery), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); see also United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d
836, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1977) (RICO tacked onto illegal gambling but charge later dropped
for lack of effect on interstate commerce), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
42. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 640 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
43. See Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D. Mass. 1986).
44. See Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 163 (D.D.C. 1983).
45. See Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct 261 (1989).
46. See Alton v. Alton, No. 82 Civ. 0795, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1982).
47. See Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
48. In February 1989, the RICO Reform Act of 1989 was introduced in the House
and the Senate. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S1652 (daily ed. Feb.
23, 1989); H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H368 (daily ed. Feb. 22,
1989).
The purpose of this Act was to "curtailt the abuses of RICO in the area of garden-
variety litigation" and "enhance significantly the flexibility of RICO to respond to differ-
ent manifestations of organized crime." 135 Cong. Rec. S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989)
(statement of Senator Hatch).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988). Section 2331 of Title 18, allows for the prosecution
of crimes of physical violence against United States nationals abroad that were "intended
to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population." 18
U.S.C. § 2331(e) (1988).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988). Section 1203 of Title 18, makes it a crime to hold a
person hostage, either in the United States or abroad. To violate section 1203, either the
hostage or his captor must be a national of the United States. If only the hostage is a
United States national, the kidnapper must be "found" in the United States or have
sought by his actions to coerce the United States government in order to be prosecuted.
51. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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ers included a provision explicitly removing economic motivation as an
element of a RICO prosecution. At the same time, however, they have
implicitly recognized the possible non-economic applications of RICO by
including these predicates.52 It can be inferred, therefore, that if the
drafters of the RICO Reform Act believed that Congress intended that
all RICO enterprise be economically motivated, they would not add non-
economically motivated crimes 3 as RICO predicates.5 4 Therefore, it is
arguable that Congress is attempting to solidify RICO's applicability to
non-financially motivated terrorist organizations.
II. RICO PREDICATES ABROAD
International terrorist activity occurs outside the territorial boundaries
of the United States." Once it is established that RICO can be applied to
non-financially motivated activities, it must then be determined whether
RICO can be expanded extraterritorially.
A. Federal Predicates
Among the federal statutes which, if violated, can serve as RICO pred-
icates, the Hobbs Act 56 and the Travel Act5v address conduct character-
istic of international terrorist activity. The Hobbs Act can be violated by
"[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
... by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of
a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section. ' 58 The
Hobbs Act has been construed to include all commerce which Congress
has the constitutional ability to regulate, including interstate and foreign
commerce.59 Therefore, hijacking an aircraft or other vessel appears to
violate both prongs of the Hobbs Act. First, a hijacking may qualify as
extortion, because the hijackers take property, the aircraft, by means of
actual or threatened force.6" The delay of passengers and cargo occa-
sioned by the hijacking is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an effect
52. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989);
H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H368, (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989).
53. It is clear that the violent acts which are the subject of section 2331 are identical
in character to those committed by the Ivic defendants. Compare United States v. Ivic,
700 F.2d 51, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1983) (conspiracy to murder and attempts to use explosives)
with 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988) (penalties for conspiring to, or actually committing, mur-
der, manslaughter or other physical violence).
54. The drafters of the RICO Reform Act were undoubtedly aware of the Second
Circuit's limitation on non-financially motivated enterprises. See 134 Cong. Rec. E2770,
E2772-73 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (Hate Crimes and RICO Reform).
55. See supra note 1.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
57. Id. at § 1952.
58. Id. at § 1951(a).
59. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960); Nathan & Juster, supra
note 1, at 555.
60. See Nathan & Juster, supra note 1, at 555-56.
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on interstate commerce." Extortion could also be shown by a demand
for ransom from the United States. The hijackers satisfy the second
prong of the Hobbs Act by committing or threatening physical violence
to people or property in furtherance of a plan to obstruct and delay com-
merce by extortion.62
The Travel Act may be violated by whoever travels, in interstate or
foreign commerce, to "commit any crime of violence to further any un-
lawful activity."6 3 Traveling on an American carrier for the purpose of
hijacking it would be a violation of section 1952. Both these Acts can be
applied extraterritorially when the criminal activity affects foreign com-
-merce. Thus, it can be argued that terrorist activity abroad that can be
characterized as one of these federal predicate acts can be used in a
RICO prosecution."5
B. State Law Predicates
In addition to the federal predicate acts, RICO includes a number of
state law predicate acts, 66 each of which must be "chargeable under State
law." '  RICO defendants have argued that states must actually be able
to prosecute the offense for it to be chargeable under state law.68 Courts
faced with this argument have held that RICO's incorporation of state
crimes is merely definitional and is not meant to incorporate state proce-
dural law.6 9 Therefore, they have interpreted the "chargeable under
state law" provision to require that the defendant have committed an act
characteristic of a State law crime.'0
Criminal jurisdiction is composed of two parts, one substantive and
the other procedural. The substantive aspect deals with the ability of
61. See United States v. Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67, 75-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 934 (1974).
62. See Nathan & Juster, supra note 1, at 556 & n.15.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) (1988).
64. See United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 174-76 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1013 (1988); United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1979).
65. See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438-40 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
67. Id at § 1961(1).
68. See United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1321 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1345 (1989); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1118 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1045(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
69. See Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1331; Paone, 782 F.2d at 393; Qaoud, 777 F.2d at
1118; Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1046-47.
70. See Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1331; Paone, 782 F.2d at 393; Qaoud, 777 F.2d at
1118; Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1046-47; United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087
n.8A (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); see also United States v. Bagaric,
706 F.2d 42, 62-63 (2d Cir.) (RICO's list of state law crimes merely definitional), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same), cert denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
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states to criminalize a certain act,71 while the procedural aspect deals
with the ability of courts to enforce criminal law.72 Although courts
have ruled that procedural bars to state prosecutions do not hinder utiliz-
ing an act as a RICO predicate,7" the act itself must still be a substantive
crime.74 In order for the federal government to incorporate an act that
occurs abroad as a predicate in a RICO prosecution, states must have the
substantive power to criminalize that extraterritorial behavior through
an exercise of jurisdiction.75
The extraterritorial jurisdiction a state possesses to criminalize behav-
ior is based on established international law.76 One theory of jurisdiction
recognized in international law is that of passive personality:
The passive personality principle asserts that a state may apply law -
particularly criminal law - to an act committed outside its territory
by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national.
The principle... is increasingly accepted as aped to terrorist and
other organized attacks on a state's nationals.'
Traditionally, relying on the common-law limitations on jurisdiction,78
states have not allowed their courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction
71. See W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 2.7, at 115 (2d ed. 1986).
72. See id.
73. United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1331 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1345 (1989); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1118 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1046-
47 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
74. See Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1331; Paone, 782 F.2d at 393; Qaoud, 777 F.2d at
1118; Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1046-47; United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087
n.8A (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
75. The substantive jurisdiction to punish a crime abroad does not necessarily grant a
state prosecutor the actual ability to prosecute an extraterritorial offender. Rather it is a
theoretical limit, past which a state cannot extend its laws. As an example, State A has
criminalized murder. Substantively the act of murder is a "State A crime" anywhere
State A has the "substantive" ability to extend its laws. State A, however, has chosen to
limit its courts and not allow prosecution when murder is committed outside its territo-
rial boundaries. This "procedural" limitation would not bar the federal government from
incorporating an act of murder which occurred within State A's substantive jurisdictional
boundaries even if State A has limited its own courts.
76. See State v. Miller, 157 Ariz. 129, 131, 755 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
In international law, there are five generally accepted bases upon which a country may
assert jurisdiction over crimes which occur totally or partially outside their territories.
See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645
F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: The United States' Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United
States v. Yunis, I5 Yale t. Int L. 121 (1990); Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts
of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 599, 600-01 (1987).
The five principles upon which a country may base its jurisdiction are: territorial,
nationality, protective, universal and passive personality. See Abramovsky, supra, at 123;
Note, supra, at 601.
77. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402
comment g (1987).
78. See W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 17, at 118 (19.72).
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over crimes occurring entirely outside their territorial boundaries.79
However, based on the Federal government's recent acceptance of the
passive personality theory as a basis for federal criminal jurisdiction, 0 it
can be argued that the states now possess the substantive jurisdiction to
criminalize behavior abroad. This is because "under our federal system,
the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Gov-
ernment, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy
Clause."'" States may exercise any basis of legislative jurisdiction recog-
nized in international law and accepted by the federal government.8 2 It
may therefore be argued that since states have the ability to exercise ju-
risdiction concurrent with the federal government, they may now use the
passive personality theory as a basis for exercising jurisdiction, thereby
invoking a dormant power to punish crimes against their residents that
occur abroad.83
States, however, have not given their courts the procedural jurisdic-
tional capabilities to punish these crimes.84 Because of the definitional
nature of the list of state law crimes,85 however, a state limiting its proce-
dural jurisdiction to its territorial boundaries should not preclude the
federal government from incorporating violent state law crimes commit-
ted against a United States citizen, who is also the resident of a state, as
predicate activity in a RICO prosecution. Since the federal government
is not limited by the procedural bars that states place on their courts, 6 it
79. See Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 244-49 (Wyo.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987).
But see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911) ("Acts done outside a jurisdic-
tion, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State
in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the defendant] had been present .... ").
80. Traditionally, the United States did not accept the passive personality theory. See
Note, supra note 76, at 603. Recently, however, the United States employed this theory
as the basis for jurisdiction in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853, 896-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988)).
See generally Note, supra note 76,passim (discussing theories ofjurisdiction applicable to
Act).
81. Taffin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990).
82. See State v. Miller, 157 Ariz. 129, 131, 755 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
83. Justice Cardozo, while on the New York State Court of Appeals, acknowledged
the power of a state to criminalize extraterritorial activity. In People v. Werblow, 241
N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925), he stated that his construction of a statute as not criminal-
izing activity which occurred abroad "[did] not mean that this construction... [was] the
consequence of some inherent limitation upon the power of the Legislature," but rather
that state criminal statutes criminalizing murder abroad "may come to pass," and
"[w]hen they come, they will establish new landmarks of criminal jurisdiction". Id. at
61-62, 148 N.E. 789; cf. W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 2.9(c)(1), at 136 (2d ed.
1986) (states have jurisdiction equal to nations and have jurisdictional limitations equal
to nations).
84. See, ag., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 20.20 (McKinney 1981) (limiting jurisdiction to
acts within state or having effect within state); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:1-3 (1987) (limiting
jurisdiction to acts within state's territory, having effect within state's territory, or within
territory under state's law subject to agreement with federal government).
85. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
86. See id.
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therefore may arguably incorporate any predicate act that parallels a
state law crime even if that act occurs abroad.
C. International Forfeiture
RICO's forfeiture powers87 make it an attractive weapon against inter-
national terrorist organizations.88 Because RICO forfeiture is an in per-
sonam action,8 9 the judgment is not limited to property within any
specific jurisdiction, but rather attaches to all the defendant's forfeitable
interest.9° Therefore, any money invested in an enterprise that affects
interstate or foreign commerce is forfeitable regardless of where it is
found. Individuals who comprise an "association in fact" enterprise,
such as a terrorist organization, are also subject to RICO's forfeiture pro-
visions.91 The entire interest such individuals held in the terrorist organi-
zation would be forfeitable.92
Organizations that have been linked to terrorist activities maintain
large annual operating budgets. For example, the Palestine Liberation
Organization allegedly has an income of 1.25 billion dollars from invest-
ments of over five billion dollars.93 That income is used to finance its
operations. The use of the forfeiture provisions against international ter-
rorist organizations would curtail the funds available to these organiza-
tions, thereby restricting their ability to operate.
Terrorist organizations have allegedly invested money in the United
States and abroad.94 Although the forfeiture of assets found within the
United States is rudimentary, international forfeiture requires interna-
tional cooperation. This cooperation is encouraged by mutual legal
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
RICO forfeiture is mandatory. Once a defendant is convicted, his interest in the enter-
prise is automatically forfeit. See id.
88. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
Forfeiture is a weapon which is not incorporated in traditional anti-terrorism laws. See
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988).
89. See 18 U.S.C. 1963 (1988).
In an in personam proceeding, the action is brought against a particular defendant. If
convicted, the property which represents the defendant's "forfeitable interest" is forfeited
to the government.
90. A "forfeitable interest" which is subject to criminal forfeiture under section 1963
includes "(1) real property [and] (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including
rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities." Id.
91. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665
F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
92. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1982).
93. See J. Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that Are Terrorizing
the World Get the Money to Do It 4 (1986).
One author noted, "[als it is known that large funds are needed to support terror
groups and that money is often invested in Western enterprises, it should be possible to
hit them in the purse... [thus] separating the killers from their money." C. Dobson &
R. Payne, The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80's, at 291-92 (1987).
94. See C. Dobson & R. Payne, supra note 93, at 291-92.
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assistance treaties to which the United States is presently a party.95
These treaties allow the United States to request the forfeiture of the
"proceeds of crime" or the "fruits and instrumentalities of crime" that
are traceable to those countries.96 Therefore, in addition to seizing prop-
erty found within the United States, these treaties allow the government
to expand its seizure powers abroad by requesting that the other party to
the treaty seize these forfeitable assets.
The power granted in these treaties is invaluable in the war on terror-
ism, because it permits the government to reach the large portion of ter-
rorist organization's assets which are scattered in a number of different
countries. These seizures are likely to have a crippling effect on terrorist
operations.
CONCLUSION
International terrorist organizations are continually increasing their
attacks on society. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act is a potentially powerful weapon available to the federal government
in the war on terrorism and should be expanded to facilitate its use
against terrorist organizations. The courts should not restrict RICO un-
reasonably by adding burdensome requirements that are not statutorily
mandated. It is time for the courts to remove the barriers that they have
created and allow prosecutors to place RICO in the arsenal of the war on
terrorism.
Zvi Joseph
95. See Legal Assistance Treaty, Apr. 25, 1988, United States-Thailand (Treaty Doc.
No. 100-18); Legal Assistance Treaty, Apr. 13, 1988, United States-Bahamas (Treaty
Doc. No. 100-17); Legal Assistance Treaty, Mar. 29, 1988, United States-Belgium
(Treaty Doc. No. 100-16); Legal Assistance Treaty, Feb. 22, 1988, United States-Canada
(Treaty Doc. No. 100-14).
96. See Legal Assistance Treaty, Apr. 25, 1988, United States-Thailand (Treaty Doc.
No. 100-18); Legal Assistance Treaty, Apr. 13, 1988, United States-Bahamas (Treaty
Doc. No. 100-17); Legal Assistance Treaty, Mar. 29, 1988, United States-Belgium
(Treaty Doc. No. 100-16); Legal Assistance Treaty, Feb. 22, 1988, United States-Canada
(Treaty Doe. No. 100-14).
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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